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Turkey’s  “Critical  Europeanization”:  Evidence from 
Turkey’s  Immigration Pol ic ies
Juliette Tolay
Introduction
Turkey’s relationship with Europe has a long and complex history. It does not 
even start in 1959, when Turkey applied for an associate membership to the EU, 
but dates back from the Ottoman Empire interactions with European powers 
over the centuries, and the way subsequently this heritage has been memorized 
and interpreted. The Euro-Ottoman history in itself is ambivalent: it features a 
powerful and proud Ottoman Empire, well aware of military and technological 
superiority  over  backward  late-Middle  Age, European entities; it  features  an 
“equal among others” Ottoman Empire, engaging in warfare and alliances with 
the emerging European powers during the European Renaissance; and it fea-
tures in the 19th century a weakened Ottoman Empire, threatened by European 
imperialist ambitions, but looking for its salvation in its Westernization, as a 
means to resist European powers.1 
The history of the Turkish republic is no different. In the Turkish psyche, 
Europe represents both a model which Turkish citizens look up to, as well as an 
imperialistic force, from which Turkey had to free and protect itself. It was par-
ticularly true during the foundational experience of creating Turkey as a mod-
ern  nation-state, when  Mustafa  Kemal  fought  against  European  powers  in 
Anatolia (mainly British, Greek and French troops), while putting into place a 
political system openly emulating European institutions and values. In Turkey, 
Europe is both admired and despised. It is still true today.
Such  an  ambivalent  relationship  uniquely  impacts  Turkey’s  bid  to  EU 
membership in the 21st century. The well-known story of Turkey’s EU aspiration 
1 Goffman (2002), Faroqhi (2004). 
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is one of a twin process: the technical one, whereby Turkey, since 2001, en-
gaged in a fast-paced and extensive reform movement of its laws and institu-
tions in order to harmonize with the Copenhagen criteria first, and then the 
broader acquis communautaire, and the political one, whereby important polit-
ical actors in the different European countries and in Turkey have expressed 
fluctuating  enthusiasm  and  reluctance  towards  Turkey’s  EU  membership. 
These two processes have been intertwined and interactive, as the extraordi-
nary reforms done in the 2001–2004 period led to the opening of accession ne-
gotiations in 2005, and as the rise of strong voices against Turkey’s member-
ship in Europe, and the rise of skepticism in Turkey, have considerably slowed 
down the reform and negotiation process since 2006.2 
One of the areas in which the EU is sharply influencing Turkey’s policy is 
the field of asylum and migration. In the 1990s, Turkey used to have an out-
dated, incomplete  and  largely  ad-hoc  policy  towards  immigration  into  the 
country, including asylum, regular and irregular migration and border man-
agement. By 2011, the picture is quite different: in all domains, different reform 
packages have been passed recently, and a comprehensive new immigration 
policy has been drafted. 
The overall timing and nature of these reforms indicate the essential role 
played by the EU. However, it is important to understand why and how exactly 
the EU influenced this  process. Much has been written about “Europeaniza-
tion”, or the way in which the EU, intentionally or not, manages to transform 
member and candidate countries’ policies, politics and identities so that they 
would better align with EU practices.3 The way Turkey in particular becomes 
Europeanized has also been extensively discussed.4 The literature shows that 
there are different levels of “Europeanization”, with some reflecting an instru-
mental adoption of policies to gain particular advantages, while others denot-
ing  a  deeper  transformation  and  internalization  of  norms, characterizing  a 
more genuine “Europeanization”.5 From a European perspective, it is extremely 
important to understand how transformative and genuine Turkey’s reforms in 
2 Although, such discourses and behaviors are themselves predicated on more structural, economic, institutional and poli-
tical developments in Turkey and in the EU. See Tocci (2007).
3 Featherstone/Radaelli (2003), Schimmelfennig/Sedelmeier (2005), Checkel (2007), Graziano/Vink (2007), Schimmelfen-
nig (2009).
4 Diez/Agnantopoulos et al. (2005), Kale (2005), Kaya (2007), Oğuzlu/Ozpek (2008), Ulusoy (2009), Lagrand (2010).
5 Lavenex/Uçarer (2004), Diez/Agnantopoulos et al. (2005), Schimmelfennig/Sedelmeier (2005), Bauer/Knill et al. (2007), 
Schimmelfennig (2009).
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the field of asylum and migration are. Migration has become a particularly sa-
lient issue in Europe because it connects to existential issues such as human 
rights and individual freedoms, as well as concerns over societal and economic 
security. Knowing whether Turkey, its state and society, genuinely fall in line 
with the values and concerns of European countries is of crucial importance 
for many European actors. 
As this chapter demonstrates, critical actors in Turkey are engaged in a 
genuine, non-instrumental process of reform in the field of asylum and migra-
tion. However, contrary to what the Europeanization literature indicates, it is 
not so much because they identified closely with Europeans, but rather because 
they distanced themselves from European practices. In many ways, Turkey has se-
lectively adopted the values and concerns of  Europe, and transformed into a 
truly “Turkish” approach to asylum and migration. This has activated a sense of 
pride among Turkish officials, with the feeling that they can do “better than 
the Europeans”, or be “more European than the Europeans”.6 This phenomenon 
that I call “critical Europeanization” is not a traditional form of Europeaniza-
tion, yet one that fits particularly well Turkey’s ambivalent historical percep-
tion of Europe. 
To understand this process better, this chapter presents succinctly the re-
forms adopted in the field of migration, the different ways in which the EU has 
influenced the process and the critical reactions that it has triggered in Turkey. 
Turkey’s Immigration Policy Profile and Its Reforms
When one thinks of Turkey as a country of immigration, one often sees Turkey 
as a “new” country of immigration, devoid of any real immigration policy, and 
one which needs to catch up with Europe and adopt appropriate policies. This 
is only partly correct. Turkey is historically a country that has received impor-
tant inflows of immigration, especially from the Balkans, all throughout the 
20th century. But, this fact was overshadowed by the large influx of Turkish mi-
grants into Europe starting in the 1960s, which, on the international migration 
scene, characterized Turkey as a country of emigration.7 
6 Meeting with a police officer, October 2009, Van, Turkey, and with officials in charge of migration, October 2009, Ankara, 
Turkey. 
7 Kirişçi (2007 b), Abadan-Unat (2011).
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Similarly, Turkey had an immigration policy, articulated principally in the 
Law on Settlement of 1934, foreseeing the immigration of migrants of “Turkish 
culture  or  origin”, and the rights  to  which  they would have access  as  they 
settled on Turkish territory.8 Turkey was also among the drafters and first sig-
natories of the Geneva Convention in 1951, practically granting Turkey with an 
asylum policy.9 
However, these existing policies came to a serious crisis by the end of the 
Cold War, when the sudden qualitative and quantitative change in migration 
flows in the region rendered existing regulations largely irrelevant and archaic. 
By the 1990s, a large majority of newcomers coming from Eastern Europe and 
the Middle East to Turkey were “foreigners”(i. e., “non-Turkish”), and could not 
be  accepted in  Turkey under  the  Law  on Settlement. Likewise, most  of  the 
asylum seekers were coming from non-European countries (mainly Iran and 
Iraq) and therefore would not qualify as Convention refugees under the geo-
graphical  limitation  of  the  Geneva  Convention  that  Turkey  maintained.10 
Hence, the impression that Turkey was a “new” country of immigration, and 
that it was “lacking” any immigration policy. 
By the end of the Cold War, the Turkish state regulation of migration issues 
overall was incomplete and inconsistent. Pieces that made up Turkish immigra-
tion policy were to be found in various places such as in the Law of Resettle-
ment,11 the Law on Foreigners,12 the Turkish Citizenship Law13 and in various in-
stitutions,  mainly  the  Ministry  of  Interior  (especially  in  the  Foreigners 
Department within the General Directorate of Security) and the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs, as well as others.14 The new situation warranted new policies, 
and it is true that it took some time for Turkey to adapt its regulations. There 
have been several publications detailing the many reforms that took place in 
the last 20 years,15 but the main reforms could be summarized as follows:
8 Kirişçi (1996 a, p. 8).
9 Frelick (1997).
10 This option (recognizing as refugees only asylum seekers coming from Europe) is offered in Article 1B(1) of the 1951 Geneva 
Convention Related to the Status of Refugees. Most signatories of the Convention lifted the geographical limitation in 1967, 
but Turkey, to this day, retains the geographical limitation.
11 İskan Kanunu.
12 The Law on Movement and Residence of Foreigners in Turkey.
13 Türk Vatandaşlığı Kanunu.
14 The Gendarmerie, the Coastal Guard, the Ministry of Health and the Ministry of Labor and Social Security are also invol-
ved in migration issues. See Kirişçi (2004, pp. 4–9).
15 Kale (2005), Kaya (2009 b), Lagrand (2010).
Turkey’s “Critical Europeanization”: Evidence from Turkey’s Immigration Policies 43
- Early step: the 1994 Asylum Regulation.16 The first serious step that 
was taken to reform Turkey’s regulations regarding migration was in 
the realm of asylum and the adoption of an important regulation in 
1994. Since 1951, Turkey has been party to the Geneva Convention Rel-
ative to the Status of Refugees, but kept the original geographical lim-
itation. This  meant  that  only  asylum  seekers  coming  from  Europe 
could be recognized as refugees. By the early 1990s, there were no reg-
ulations  governing the  status  of  non-European refugees  in  Turkey. 
The  1994  Regulation  remedied  this  in  a  compromise  solution,  by 
granting rights to non-European Refugees to apply for asylum in Tur-
key (both to Turkish authorities and the UNHCR), with the condition 
that, once recognized with a refugee status, they would have to be re-
settled in a third country. Far from ideal, this regulation (amended in 
1999 and 2006 to accommodate more realistically the time within 
which asylum seekers had to apply for asylum) is the main frame-
work on which Turkey’s asylum system functioned up to 2011.17 
- First  package of  reforms:  2002–2005 reforms. Overall, the  period of 
2002–2005 represented a time of earthquake reforms in the Turkish 
legal system. In order to ensure the opening of negotiations with the 
EU (eventually granted in 2005), Turkey engaged in a breath-taking 
large-scale  revision  of  many  of  its  regulations.  This  impacted  the 
realm of asylum and migration, as well. Among other things, in 2003, 
the Law on Work Permits for Foreign Nationals was adopted, the Law 
on Citizenship was amended and the additional protocols against mi-
grant smuggling and human trafficking of the United Nations Con-
vention  Against  Transnational  Organized  Crime  were  adopted.18 
2002–2005 was also a period when Turkey was working hard on ad-
justing its visa system to the Schengen negative and positive lists, 
and took several steps in that direction.19 
- Further  plans  for  comprehensive  reforms: the  2005  National  Action 
Plan for the Adoption of the EU Acquis in the Field of Asylum and Im-
16 The official title is: The Regulation On The Procedures And the Principles Related to Population Movements and Aliens Ar-
riving In Turkey Either As Individuals Or In Groups Wishing To Seek Asylum Either From Turkey Or Requesting Residence Per-
mission In Order To Seek Asylum From Another Country. 
17 Kirişçi (1996 b), Kaya (2009 a).
18 Çiçekli (2006), Kaya (2009 b).
19 Kirişçi (2005).
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migration (NAP). Following the enforcement in 2003 of the Turkish 
National Program on the Adoption of the EU Acquis Communautaire, 
a systematic effort was undertaken by Turkish authorities to identify 
the areas of  fit  and misfit  between the acquis  communautaire  and 
Turkish regulations. This effort resulted in the NAP,20 identifying the 
necessary  reforms  and  proposing  a  timeframe  to  undertake  them. 
This document is important, as it seems to be the first effort in which 
Turkish authorities think comprehensively about their immigration 
policy. 
- Period of adjustments: 2005–2008. Following the number of changes 
that occurred in the 2002–2005 period, a couple more important but 
limited reforms were achieved in the subsequent years. This includes 
the revision of the Law on Settlement in 2006 (which improved some 
of the outdated language coming from 1934, but without changing 
the main logic of  the document), the circulation of  the Implemen-
tation Circular from the General Directorate of Security in 2006 en-
couraging a better implementation of the asylum system, the adop-
tion of a new Passport Law in 2007 and the amendment of the Land 
Registry Law in 2008 providing easier access to property to foreign-
ers.21
- Launch of comprehensive reforms: 2008. In line with the principles 
adopted in the 2005 National Action Plan, a task force on migration 
and  asylum  was  established  in  late  2008  (“Asylum  and  Migration 
Unit for the development and implementation of legislation and ad-
ministrative capacities”).22 The  main  goal  of  this  task  force  was  to 
draft  new  legislation  on  asylum  and  foreigners  in  Turkey  and  de-
lineate  the  new  responsibilities  of  a  new  agency  responsible  for 
asylum and migration. This new step in the process of reforms of Tur-
key’s migration policies is extremely important for two reasons: first, 
it engages in the creation of a new comprehensive migration policy 
for  Turkey, and second, it  demonstrates  a change in approach and 
mindset within Turkish bureaucracy regarding issues of asylum and 
migration. This team of bureaucrats constituting the task force is ex-
20 Turkish National Action Plan for the Adoption of the EU Aquis in the Field of Asylum and Migration (2005).
21 Kaya (2009 b).
22 İltica ve Göç Mevzuatı ve Idari Kapasitesini Geliştirme ve Uygulama Bürosu. This office is attached to the undersecretary 
of the Ministry of Interior. 
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tremely open to change and new ideas, having been consulting sys-
tematically with academics, international organizations and NGOs (a 
quite unusual approach for Turkish bureaucracy). By mid-2011, they 
had an official draft of a new Law on Foreigners and International 
Protection ready to be submitted to the Parliament.23 The activities 
undertaken by this task force also seem to have had a trickle-down 
effect on actual policies, especially on asylum, as new circulars have 
been put into place to address some of the blatant problems in the 
system, as highlighted by the team of the task force.24 
By  2011,  the  extraordinary  reform  journey  undertaken  by  Turkey  reflects  a 
story of overall compliance to EU norms and regulations. As European actors 
expressed their concerns through official and unofficial channels, Turkish au-
thorities reacted and initiated a process of reforms. This process was, however, 
never linear and progressive, but rather involved a lot of politics, resistance and 
unequal developments. There is even one area where compliance initially took 
place, but then got reversed: this is the case of visa policies.
The area of visa policy and border management was one of the issues in-
cluded in the harmonization packages in the 2002–2003 period. The agree-
ment reached at that point was that Turkey would gradually adopt the nega-
tive  list  of  the  Schengen  agreement  to  align  with  the  visa  policy  of  the 
majority of EU member states. Turkey started to implement that policy, and by 
2005, Turkey was only five countries short on the list to be fully aligned to the 
Schengen negative list (down from 13 countries in 2002).25 However, this policy 
changed in 2005, at which point Turkey started to refrain from imposing new 
visa regulations on new countries. By 2009, Turkey started to actively reverse 
its policy by seeking to systematically remove visa requirements with almost 
every country it was entering in a political agreement. In 2009, in opposition 
to the Schengen practice, Turkey agreed to lift visa requirements with  Syria, 
Libya, Jordan and Albania; it continued to do so in 2010 with Russia, Lebanon 
23 Meeting with members of the Asylum and Migration Unit, October, December 2009 and June 2010, Istanbul and Anka-
ra, Turkey.
24 In 2010 only, the following were put into place: a Circular on Irregular Migration by the Ministry of Interior in March, a Cir -
cular on Refugees and Asylum Seekers by the Ministry of Interior in March, a Circular on Asylum Seekers and Refugees by 
the Social Services and Child Protection Agency in March, a Circular on Procedures concerning Asylum Seekers and Refu-
gees by the Social Services and Child Protection Agency in April, a Circular on Students of Foreign origin by the Ministry of  
Education in August and an update on the 2006 application directive on asylum by the Ministry of Interior. 
25 Kirişçi (2005), Kirişçi (2007 a).
46 Juliette Tolay
and Serbia, and seems to pursue this policy further in 2011 with discussions 
with Qatar, Malaysia, Bahrain and Kyrgyzstan. In May 2011, Minister of Foreign 
Affairs Ahmet Davutoğlu declared that in the last eight years, Turkey reached 
visa-free agreements with no less than 50 countries.26
Why do we observe this change of approach in Turkey’s position on visa 
policy? Why is visa policy the area where compliance did not occur while all 
other areas ensured compliance or steps towards compliance? How did the EU 
react  to  such  an  unexpected  move?  These  are  all  questions  that  will  be 
answered in the following sections. 
The Role Played by the EU: The Different Forms and Degrees of 
Europeanization
There is not much doubt regarding the central role played by the EU in this pro-
cess of reforming Turkey’s immigration policy. Except for the early changes in 
asylum policies in the mid-1990s,27 all the other reforms were explicitly situ-
ated in the framework of the EU harmonization process.28 
As has often been highlighted in the Europeanization literature, the EU 
can impact candidate countries in a number of different ways, including di-
rectly with conditionality requirements and indirectly as it affects a candidate 
country through a third actor, such as the ECHR (European Court of Human 
Rights), or domestic actors. Evidence of both processes can be presented here. 
The direct influence of the EU is evident in some of the 2002–2005 reforms, 
which were adopted in order to satisfy the Copenhagen political criteria. Sub-
sequently, the adoption of the National Action Plan (and the beginning of its 
application) is a clear outcome of the EU’s conditionality and demands for har-
monization. In this particular case, the EU was particularly efficient in ensur-
ing that Turkish authorities plan in detail the reforms needed by using the tool 
of a “twinning project”. In the period 2003–2004, no less than eight twinning 
projects were initiated on issues such as strengthening institutions in the fight 
against trafficking in human beings, visa police and practice, asylum, border 
26 Anadolu Ajansı (2011).
27 Even these changes, however, were clearly reacting to the European wave of criticism regarding Turkey’s approach to asy-
lum in the early 1990s. Kirişçi (1996 b). 
28 Kirişçi (2003), Kale (2005), Çiçekli (2006), Kirişçi (2009), Lagrand (2010).
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protection, law enforcement and migration issues.29 Since 2010, there are at 
least two ongoing twinning projects in the field of asylum and migration: one 
on “supporting Turkey’s capacity in combating irregular migration through the 
establishment of removal centers” and one on “establishing a system of recep-
tion, screening and accommodation for asylum seekers and refuges”.30 The EU 
is also funding “the establishment of reception centers in seven key locations 
in Turkey” and the “set-up of an asylum and country of origin information sys-
tems”.
But  the  EU  also  instigated  changes  in  Turkish  asylum  and  migration 
policies through indirect means: through decisions taken by the ECHR and by 
the development of civil society. As a member of the Council of Europe, and 
party to the European Convention on Human Rights, Turkey has often been on 
trial  in  the  ECHR, and  has  often  lost  the  case. Even  though  the  Council  of 
Europe and the EU are two separate institutions, the EU is pressuring Turkey to 
take the decisions of the Court seriously. Four cases are particularly important 
in the field of asylum and migration: the case of Jabari v. Turkey in 2000,31 the 
case of Mamatkulov and Askarov v. Turkey in 2005,32 the case of Abdolkhani 
and Karimnia v. Turkey in 200933 and the case of Charahili v. Turkey in 2010.34 It 
is not the place of this article to go into the details of the cases,35 but in each 
case,  Turkey’s  practices  condemned  by  the  Court  then  triggered  a  higher 
awareness on the issue of asylum in Turkey and the shortcomings of the sys-
tem, which then often prompted changes in the system. Recently, Turkish offi-
cials within the Task Force have admitted that they have been “hit hard” by the 
most recent 2010 decisions of the Court, and that they were determined to put 
into place a new asylum system that would eschew altogether any such con-
demnation from the Court in the future.36 
But another, more profound and long-term indirect way in which the EU 
contributed to the process of reforms in Turkey was through civil society. The 
EU played an important role in encouraging and financing projects upheld by 
29 Kirişçi (2007 a, p. 8).
30 See The EU and Turkey Address the Common Challenges of Migration and Asylum (2010). 





36 Meeting with members of the Migration and Asylum Unit, October 2009, Ankara, Turkey.
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Turkish civil society. One of the most striking changes in the migration land-
scape in Turkey over the first decade of the 21st century has indeed been the 
creation and expansion of civil society organizations and actors. In 2000, there 
were very few organizations involved in the field of asylum and migration, and 
such institutions were almost exclusively engaged in first-hand relief  activ-
ities. Today, the situation is very different, with a larger number of NGOs very 
active in the terrain and involved in wide range of activities, from first-hand 
relief to legal, social and psychological counseling activities, and from raising 
awareness  campaigns  to  government  lobbying  activities.37 Many  of  these 
NGOs have greatly benefited from the symbolical and financial support of the 
EU. Symbolically, both the field of asylum and migration and the strengthening 
of civil society actors has always been a priority for the EU. Financially, the EU 
has financed several NGO projects,38 as well as large-capacity building projects 
for Turkish bureaucracy that always emphasizes the consultation and partici-
pation of NGOs working in this field.39 Such an indirect means of Europeaniza-
tion, whereby the EU enables and strengthens (if not creates) pro-EU values do-
mestic actors, who in turn impact the policies decided by the government, are 
a documented way of Europeanization.40 
One should, however, not overstate the impact of Europeanization in the 
field of asylum and migration in Turkey. The process of Europeanization out-
lined above should not overshadow the fact that Europeanization is  incom-
plete at two different levels. At the policy level, Turkey is still far from having 
applied all the different reforms envisioned in the National Action Plan neces-
sary to complete the process of harmonization. The most critical items that re-
main on the to-do list include the lifting of the geographical limitation, the 
37 Several NGOs work exclusively on rights and assistance to refugees, asylum seekers and irregular migrants. These include 
ASAM (Association for Solidarity with Asylum Seekers and Migrants), Mülteci-Der (Association for Solidarity with Refugees) 
and Mülteci-Net and GDA (the Solidarity Network for Migrants). Many other established NGOs have also created special  
migrant and refugee programs, such as the Turkish branch of the HCA (Helsinki Citizens’ Assembly), MazlumDer (The Asso-
ciation for Human Rights and Solidarity for Oppressed People), Amnesty International, Human Rights Association, IHH (The 
Foundation for Human Rights and Freedoms and Humanitarian Relief), Deniz Feneri, etc. 
38 For instance, in 2009, the EU funded two projects. One with ASAM, called “Suspended Lives, Perceived Lives”, aimed at  
raising awareness and training public authorities and civil society officers on asylum seekers. The second one was with the 
Human Rights Foundation of Turkey on the effective protection of the rights of refugees, asylum seekers and other persons 
in need of international protection. 
39 Meeting with official from EU delegation in Ankara, March 2011. 
40 Tocci (2005).
Turkey’s “Critical Europeanization”: Evidence from Turkey’s Immigration Policies 49
signing of the readmission agreement41 and the alignment to the Schengen 
visa system. And at the population level, the Turkish actors that have been so-
cialized and accepted the norms of the EU represent a very limited segment of 
the broader Turkish population. These include a couple hundred civil society 
activists, academics and, more recently, officials of Turkish bureaucracy and 
some politicians. This is not to say that the rest of Turkish population opposes 
EU norms on asylum and migration, but rather that there is a lack of interest 
and public discourse on these issues, which makes it difficult to know how the 
rest of the population truly positions itself. At best, one can therefore only talk 
of a partial Europeanization. 
A more important question regarding the means and types of Europe-
anization of the issue of asylum and migration in Turkey is the extent to which 
the observed Europeanization is sincere and genuine, or whether it is simply a 
tactical move from Turkish counterparts in order to gain particular advantages, 
the most  central  one of  which  is  gaining EU  membership. Europeanization 
scholars  have  framed  this  question  with  different  terms,  such  as  “poli-
cy-Europeanization” vs. “societal-Europeanization”,42 or Europeanization driven 
by the “logic of consequences” (according to rational interests) or the “logic of 
appropriateness” (as actors truly adopt the EU values and believe them to be 
normatively the most appropriate values).43 
In the case of Turkey and migration, one can clearly see the works of the 
logic of consequences: there is no doubt that Turkish counterparts are using 
this process of reforms along EU guidance as a means to negotiate particular 
advantages. This is particularly obvious in the case of the signature of the read-
mission agreement between Turkey and the EU. In the last six years of nego-
tiations over the readmission agreement, Turkey has used it as a leverage to 
obtain other readmission agreements with countries sending migrants into 
Turkey, as well as to negotiate the liberalization of visa requirements for Turk-
ish nationals in the Schengen area.44 The case of the lifting of the geographical 
limitation in Turkey’s asylum system is another point in case: in the National 
Action Plan, this lift has been clearly conditioned on Turkey’s entry into the EU, 
indicating that Turkey does not consider the lift as a goal that could be materi-
41 Over the course of 2010, negotiations over the readmission agreement had resumed, but they collapsed in early 2011. 
42 Diez/Agnantopoulos et al. (2005).
43 March/Olsen (1989), Schimmelfennig/Sedelmeier (2005).
44 İçduygu (2010). 
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alized absent of the EU carrot.45 But more broadly, one can see how over the 
years Turkish officials have gained a better understanding of the workings of 
the EU, and hence have become more skillful and tougher negotiators in the 
process. From a Turkish perspective, this is only fair, to say the least, as they see 
their relation with the EU as being strongly imbalanced in favor of the EU, with 
the EU being able to gain more advantage from the relation than Turkey does. 
Furthermore, such an approach is not incompatible with a deeper and more 
genuine form of Europeanization. 
In general, it is much more difficult to measure or prove the workings of 
the logic of appropriateness. In the case of the Europeanization of the issue of 
migration in Turkey, one can however point at a couple of issues that hinge on 
a more profound correspondence of so-called “EU” norms and “Turkish” norms 
(whether it was compatible or was the result of a transformation). The first one 
is discursive evidence, looking at the ways Turkish actors talk about the issue 
of migration.46 It is very clear from the discourse developed by civil society ac-
tors, and a cursory look at the literature that they have developed can easily 
identify the correspondence between the values upheld in the reports and the 
ones upheld by the EU. For instance, the website of the NGO Mülteci-Der47 is 
regularly uploaded with European news, court decisions, European NGO re-
ports, etc., alongside with domestic reports and news regarding asylum. Inter-
estingly enough, not only the secular NGOs sisters in form and content to the 
European NGOs, but also the so-called “Islamic” NGOs would employ, among 
others, concepts  of  rights  and  freedoms  that  clearly  refer  to  the  European 
norms: “[T]he inhuman conditions of the centers where foreigners are held, the 
need they have to resort to the administrative court, or even the ECHR because 
of the hardship they face, etc. are proofs that the legal problems faced by these 
people need to be solved. What refugees in Turkey need the most is legal assis-
tance. Accordingly, important responsibilities  befall  on bar associations and 
NGOs”.48 
This discursive adoption of European norms and standards can also be 
noted to some extent with high-ranking officials and bureaucrats in charge of 
45 Kirişçi (2007 a).
46 Beyond the Turkish migration, there have been numerous statements by high-level officials evidencing the genuine adop-
tion (or at least the intent to genuinely adopt) of EU norms. See, for instance, The New Anatolian (2005). 
47 Mültecilerle Dayanışma Derneği.
48 [My translation]. This sentence was said by a lawyer, member of the NGO Mazlumder, during a conference in 2008 organized by  
IHH. Both Mazlumder and IHH are known for being so-called “Islamic” NGOs. Quote can be found in Düşünce Gündem (2008). 
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migration in the Turkish political system. It is particularly true of officials who 
have received some form of training in Europe, and who, on some particular is-
sues only, report their admiration and desire to apply these same standards in 
Turkey. They tend to appreciate the fact that, in the EU, there is an existing offi-
cial  framework,  a  clear  and  intentional  immigration  policy  and  allocated 
means that allows for a more comprehensive and consistent state policy to-
wards migration.49 
The  other  piece  of  evidence  that  Turkish  actors  have  internalized  EU 
norms on migration is the timing of reforms. Most of the reforms happening 
after 2005, and especially the current drafting of new legislation, is happening 
at a time when the EU membership process is stalled, and as chapter 24 (on 
Justice and Home Affairs, where issues of asylum and migration are mostly 
contained) is not open to negotiations yet. There is therefore a certain discon-
nect  between the EU membership process  and the  reforms at  stake, which 
seems to indicate that Turkey is ready to adopt these reforms whatever the 
outcome of the EU accession process is. 
As it is highlighted from the paragraphs above, the existing Europeaniza-
tion literature and concepts offer a lot of room for a differentiated, nuanced 
analysis of a complex political process. Turkey, in the field of asylum and mi-
gration, is not simply Europeanized or not Europeanized, but rather demon-
strates  different  traits  in  which  a  process  is  ongoing,  overall  highlighting 
Europeanization, but  also  showing  areas  of  resistance  and  room  for  future 
changes. But, this Europeanization story does not tell  the whole picture: in-
deed, it does not explain why some reforms have been unproblematic and why 
some others are very much problematic. There are indeed some grey zones in 
the process of reform of migration policies, which cannot easily be grasped and 
understood from a European perspective using the tools of the Europeaniza-
tion literature. 
The major shortcoming of  this  literature is that it  envisions only non-
compliance, slow compliance and fast compliance. It does not envision a case 
of reversed compliance, or “de-Europeanization”. Hence, it can hardly shed any 
light on the reasons why Turkey, after an initial period of compliance in the 
field of visa regulation, then changed its mind and reversed its policy of apply-
ing  the  Schengen  visa  system  to  Turkey. Another  related  and  more  subtle 
shortcoming  of  the  Europeanization  literature  relates  to  its  underlying  as-
49 Meeting with members of the Migration and Asylum Unit, October 2009, Ankara, Turkey. 
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sumption that the body of values, rules, regulations and practices embodied in 
the EU legal system is coherent. Therefore, according to this logic, the only con-
flict that can occur during the “Europeanization” process is one between do-
mestic rules and the EU. What the analysis of Turkey’s immigration policy re-
form demonstrates is that the EU system is in itself internally inconsistent and 
conflictual, which creates both problems and opportunities for domestic actors 
engaged in Europeanization. Very early on, Turkish officials have been aware 
of the contradictions inherent in the EU legal system in the realm of asylum 
and migration.50 
Turkey’s Critical Reading of EU Migration Policies
Europeanization is rarely a neat and consensual political process, which rallies 
the unanimous efforts of the different segments of the population. In almost 
every case, Europeanization challenges the existing balance of interests and 
forces  within a  particular  political  system, enabling  some actors  while  dis-
abling  some  others,  hence  creating  supporters  and  opponents  to  this 
Europeanization. In the case of asylum and migration in Turkey, however, it 
seems that, from the beginning, Europeanization has triggered a particularly 
high level of frustration, anger and feelings of unfairness. Whatever the rea-
sons  behind  this  situation  (whether  the  situation  is  objectively  unfair  or 
whether Turkish actors are more prone to be critical of the EU), this has created 
a situation where, for  the last 20 years, EU migration policies and practices 
have been read through a particularly critical lens in Turkey.
These critical arguments articulated in Turkey can be summarized as fol-
lows. The first  level  of  critique  is  about  the  cost  of  change and  is  a  rather 
straightforward and superficial critique, emphasizing the high-level costs im-
plied by some reforms of the system. This is particularly the case for policies 
that  require  either  Turkey  to  accept  and  better  receive  migrants  (mainly 
asylum seekers and refugees), or to have a more active policy for controlling 
migration, especially at the borders. The argument goes that this requires ex-
tensive  investment  in  an  area  that  may  not  be  a  priority  for  Turkey, even 
though it is a priority for the EU: “We agree to cooperate, but to put into place 
detention centers, we need financial support from the EU.”51 
50 See, for instance, the early writings of Kirişçi (1996 c), Kirişçi (1996 b), Kirişçi (2000).
51 [My translation.] Meeting with a member of the Asylum and Migration Unit, October 2009, Istanbul, Turkey. 
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The second level of critique is focusing on the process of EU accession, 
and the fact that there is an imbalance of power between the EU and Turkey. 
“Accession negotiations” is a poor term to reflect a process whereby Turkey has 
little to negotiate except the timing of reforms, given that the ultimate content 
of the reforms to be adopted are already pre-determined (the EU acquis).52 Con-
sequently, Turkey has no leverage over the process and is doomed to accept 
whatever demands the EU has, even if inappropriate. It is obvious, for instance, 
that Turkish counterparts are not comfortable and very critical about the EU 
visa policy scheme, but, in the long term, it does not seem that Turkey will 
have any alternative options, unless it is willing to jeopardize its EU member-
ship.53 
A third level of critique, again a process-oriented critique, relates to the 
contradictory demands and mixed signals sent to Turkey by the EU. There is in-
deed a keen sense of frustration and powerlessness from Turkish officials on 
the fact that the EU seems to be asking Turkey to simultaneously be “nicer on 
asylum seekers” and “tougher on irregular migrants” when in reality the dis-
tinction  between  the  two  is  very  blurred.  This  led  to  a  situation  where 
whatever Turkish authorities do, they will end up being harshly criticized by 
some EU actors. For instance, the rise in the number of apprehensions of irreg-
ular migrants by Turkish police forces in 2000 and 2001 was correlated with an 
increase  in  criticism  on  Turkey  over  its  violation  of  migrants  and  asylum 
seekers’ rights. 
A fourth level of critique is content-oriented and rests on the perceived 
securitization  of  the  issue  of  migration  in  Europe, and  the  fact  that  these 
policies are unfair to migrants. Not all Turkish actors have raised such a voice, 
as some actors have readily accepted the securitized understanding of migra-
tion.54 But, some have been extremely vocal against often invoking the “cool-
bloodedness and materialism” of Europeans contrasting to the “empathy and 
emotionalism” of Turks. The argument goes that seeing migrants from a secu-
rity  perspective  dehumanizes  migrants,  and  that  it  is  not  appropriate  for 
Europe to ask Turkey to apply securitized policies.55 
52 Tolay (2009).
53 Meeting with a high-ranking official in the Prime Minister’s office, October 2009, Istanbul, Turkey. 
54 Biehl (2009).
55 [My translations.] “If Turkey initiates the writing of a comprehensive asylum policy, for sure it will be more humanistic 
than the European approach. In Europe, the approach to migration is more materialist, i. e., the main question in their mind 
is ‘how much will I gain from migrants’ labor?’ In Turkey, the culture is different, our approach is more social and human-
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A fifth content-oriented level of critique is one that emphasizes how EU 
demands are unfair to Turkey. This relates to the deeply imprinted impression 
in Turkey that the EU migration policies and demands on Turkey are designed 
to use Turkey as a buffer zone and dumping ground of migrants in the process 
of building “Fortress Europe”. It also ties to the perception that Europe is trying 
to shift the burden of migration onto Turkey (as opposed to sharing the bur-
den) and that the EU is instrumentally using the accession process as a tool to 
“make good use” of Turkey.56 
Finally, the  sixth  content-oriented  critique, inter-related  with  the  two 
previous ones, points out the faultiness of certain EU migration policy. This is es-
pecially the case with the Schengen visa policy, about which Turkish counter-
parts emphasize the hypocrisy. The EU puts a strong emphasis on the benefits 
of a visa-free regime for the creation of a zone of stability and prosperity, as 
the EU did internally in the earlier years of the Community. However, it ex-
cludes third neighboring countries (including candidate countries) from this 
zone of stability and prosperity with a restrictive external visa policy.57 Turkish 
citizens are particularly frustrated and vocal about the unfairness of the strict 
visa regime that the EU applied to them.58 It is therefore unsurprising that Tur-
key would be reluctant to adopt a similar policy, hence partly explaining the 
“visa-openings” in which Turkey is involved. The fact that Turkey is positioned 
on the other side of the fence on this issue makes it particularly easy and con-
venient to identify the faultiness and critique EU policies. 
Understanding these critiques helps us understand the scope, extent and 
limits of some of the reforms undertaken in Turkey in the realm of asylum and 
immigration. In particular, it  explains why many reforms were undertaken, 
istic”. Meeting with members of the Migration and Asylum Unit, October 2009, Ankara, Turkey. “Turkey sees the visa as a 
tool of soft power, as a way to reduce illegal migration. The EU, on the other hand, sees it as a security issue”. Meeting with 
an official from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, October 2009, Ankara, Turkey. 
56 [My translations.] “It is conditional that the EU eventually shares the financial burden with Turkey. But even so, the police 
here is reluctant and feeling that we are going to become the ‘refugee garbage of the EU’ ”. Meeting with a civil society ac-
tivist, October 2009, Izmir, Turkey. “Now the EU is simply dumping people to Turkey”. Meeting with an official from the Mi-
nistry of Foreign Affairs, October 2009, Ankara, Turkey. See also Kirişçi (2009).
57 Even though, with the ENP, the EU signaled its intention to facilitate and/or liberalize visa requirements with neighboring 
countries, but without much success so far. 
58 See in particular the reports published by IKV (Economic Development Foundation) as one illustration of the amount of 
frustration and activism developed in regards to EU visa requirements towards Turkish citizens. IKV-228 “Visa Hotline Pro-
ject” – Background Paper: Turkish Citizens’ Rights in the EU. IKV-231: “Visa Hotline Project” Project Report. IKV-232: 
Visa Policy of Member States and the EU Towards Turkish Nationals After Soysal. IKV-233: “Visa Hotline Project” – Sur-
vey Report. 
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while signing the readmission agreement and applying the Schengen visa sys-
tem were resisted (because they present securitized approach to migration) 
and so is the lifting of the geographical limitation (because of the cost it would 
entail for Turkey). 
But it  also tells  a particularly interesting story regarding the extent of 
Europeanization in Turkey. On one hand, it  demonstrates a certain distance 
put between Turkey and Europe. Partly as a reaction to the perceived “other-
ing” done by the Europeans, Turkish counterparts also perceive Europeans as 
“them” and are able to distinguish their practice and their norms from “ours” 
(Turkish ones). But on the other hand, it also demonstrates a deep appropri-
ation of EU norms (regarding migrants’ rights and the virtuous effects of open 
borders and integration), strong enough that Turkish counterparts are able to 
identify  and  criticize  when  European  partners  do  not  live  up  to  their  own 
standards. In that sense, and at least in the realm of migration policy, Turkish 
citizenship can claim the intent to  “become more European than the Euro-
peans”.59
This statement, “be more European than the Europeans”, which can be 
heard repetitively in Turkey in many different contexts, is very ambivalent and 
should be understood in the framework of this ambivalence. It is indeed often 
associated with an acute sense of national pride, which seems contradictory 
since it does not affirm that “Turks are better than the Europeans” but links the 
proud feeling of being Turkish with Europeanness. It  should also be under-
stood as a “sweet avenging” against Europeans, as they have always upheld 
Turkish people as “inferiors”. This statement is also rooted in a new feeling of 
confidence born out of Turkey’s recent economic expansion and pro-active for-
eign policy, at a time when Europe seems to be confounded in a succession of 
crises.  But  more  fundamentally,  this  statement  is  grounded  in  the  late-
19th/early-20th  century association of  Europe with the “standards  of  civiliza-
tion”, an evidently European discourse that also took root in the late Ottoman 
Empire  and  in  the  young  Turkey. Later  in  the  20th century  this  association 
between Europe and the standards of civilization was transformed into the as-
59 Meeting, Ministry of Interior, October 2009. See also: [My translations.] “There was a UNHCR program in Poland in 1998.  
Poland had no previous experience with asylum. We will not do like Poland, we are very experienced, and we will put into 
place a policy that is suitable to our country. We can do better than Poland. Already, what we put into place between 2003 
and 2007 was done, even before the deadline was set. We internalized the norms and acted fast”. Meeting with an official 
from the police department, October 2009, Ankara, Turkey. “The EU is making transactions with people, and thinks of mi-
gration at a political level. Our policy will be done according to our own standards, and the EU will see us as an example”.  
Meeting with a police official, October 2009, Van, Turkey. 
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sociation of Europe (or the West) and democracy, to the extent that for many 
the  term  “Europeanization”  equaled  the  meaning  of  “democratization”.  In 
many ways, Turkey in the 21th century engaged in the process of decoupling 
these two terms, hence addressing a problem of cognitive dissonance that has 
plagued Turkish history whereby Turkey would both praise Europe for what it 
achieved, and despise Europe at the same time for what it had done to Turkey. 
Such a decoupling is not an easy process, however, hence it is characterized by 
contradictions and ambiguities. 
This particular process in itself should be good news to Europe. Not be-
cause it means that Turkey will become a docile partner in negotiations – on 
the contrary, evidence seems to show that Turkey’s character will continue to 
be  felt  strongly  at  all  stages  of  negotiations  –  but  because, in  the  field  of 
asylum and migration, Turkey is truly adhering to the positive norms defended 
by the EU. In many ways, Turkey is  demonstrating that they are becoming 
“good but demanding Europeans”. The positive aspect of this is that this “criti-
cal Europeanization” of Turkey is working as a strong source of motivation for 
further reforms in Turkey. This comes at a time when Turkey feels rejected by 
the EU, and contrary to what had happened in a similar situation in the late 
1990s, the rejection is not directly negatively impacting the process of reforms 
(at least in this area) – reforms can be undertaken even despite the ill-will of 
the EU.60 Secondly, it is also good news for the EU, as Turkey can help the EU be 
more  aware  of  some  problematic  policies, or  play  as  a  laboratory  for  new 
policies (as is the case with the visa policy now). This can explain why, for in-
stance, the EU has so far refrained from openly criticizing Ankara’s visa policy 
even though it openly contradicts its EU bid European partners are curious to 
see how viable and replicable in less stable regions an open visa policy is. As for 
future reversals of the implementation of the Schengen visa system, high-rank-
ing officials are not saying that they gave up on the Schengen visa system, but 
rather that it can be applied later, at which point there will, in principle, be a 
change in the visa-free agreements with most Middle Eastern countries. Some 
officials even believe that by then Turkey will  have succeeded in convincing 
their European partners that a liberal external visa policy would also be benefi-
cial to EU.61 
60 [My translation.] “Why the reforms now? Everything should be done in time, we became aware of the issue, and we 
created a new public opinion on the issue of migration. The timing of the EU does not matter so much anymore”. Meeting 
with members of the Migration and Asylum Unit, October 2009, Ankara, Turkey.
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Nevertheless, this analysis should not overshadow the rest of the story. 
The phenomenon of “critical Europeanization” that has been identified here is 
a nascent phenomenon, a particularly interesting one that should be closely 
observed, but not a very broad and representative one. We have found evi-
dence of this among a small segment of the population, and regarding a very 
particular issue (asylum and migration). The more general story seems to be 
one of a combination of traditional Europeanization with trends of resistance, 
which could be a source of concerns. However, given the background and inter-
esting  ambivalent  relationship  that  Turkey  has  entertained  with  Europe, it 
might be that “critical Europeanization” is potentially a broader phenomenon 
that could explain and predict much more of Turkish behaviors in the future. 
Conclusion
This chapter has identified the existence, in the field of asylum and migration, 
of a non-traditional form of Europeanization, referred to as “Critical European-
ization”. On asylum and migration, Turkey has engaged in a formidable process 
of reform, testifying to its willingness to harmonize its regulation to the EU ac-
quis. However, the rationale behind these reforms are rooted both in the ac-
ceptance of the desirability of many of the norms and policies and in the cri-
tique addressed to many EU policies towards immigration. On that note, the 
form of Europeanization that Turkey has engaged in is  one that adopts the 
norms, internalizes them, and is able to use them confidently as standards to 
which they can upheld EU policies and demands towards Turkey, hence devel-
oping  an  openly  critical  voice  towards  the  EU. It  is  a  very  reinsuring  phe-
nomenon for the EU, who gained, admittedly, a difficult partner, but also one 
that can truly contribute to the EU construction. The fact that some segments 
of Turkish bureaucracy have internalized the idea of having a more systematic 
and rule-based policy toward migration will ease the path of reform in the fu-
ture by decreasing the fear that EU demands will go against Turkish interests. 
But, the road will remain bumpy. 
61 [My translation.] “Our visa policy is in contradiction to the EU policy? So what? When we get into the EU, then we will 
change our position. This is not at all a problem”. Meeting with a high-ranking official in the Prime Minister’s office, October 
2008, Istanbul, Turkey. 
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